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elations between China and the West have 
been difficult at best in recent months. 
Frustrations on both sides have increased 
palpably. Besides long-standing disagreements over 
Beijing’s policy on the renminbi, the stalled climate 
change negotiations and human rights, new 
challenges have also (re)emerged. These include, 
amongst others, rising concerns over China’s role in 
the South China Sea and the conflict over the 
Japanese-controlled Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the 
East China Sea. Recently, however, one issue in 
particular has made the headlines: rare earths. 
Rare earths are a previously little-known group of 17 
elements consisting of scandium, yttrium and the 
lanthanide series1 and have become a major point of 
contention. Vital for the production of low-carbon 
products such as hybrid cars and wind turbines; 
consumer goods such as cell phones and computers 
and sensitive military hardware like cruise missiles 
and smart bombs, rare earths are indispensable for 
high-tech industries and emerging technologies. With 
China responsible for the production of almost 97% 
of these rare earth elements (REE), recent reductions 
in exports, coupled with increasing export taxes, are 
causing jitters not only in the markets but also 
politically. Export quotas were slashed by 72% in the 
summer for the rest of 2010 (year-on-year), while 
further reductions for 2011 are currently being 
                                                     
1 The lanthanide elements ranging from atomic number 57 to 
71 are lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, 
promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, 
dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium and 
lutetium. 
discussed. Although these cuts have only now made 
the headlines, they have long been part of a well-
calculated long-term strategy that is now paying 
dividends.  
China’s long march towards rare earths 
dominance 
Interest in rare earths became apparent in the early 
years of the People’s Republic, particularly in relation 
to research and development (R&D). The General 
Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals was 
established in Beijing in 1952, followed by the 
Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths, the world’s 
largest rare earth research institute, in 1963. At this 
point, most of the world’s rare earths were sourced 
from South Africa, eventually superseded by the 
United States with its mine at Mountain Pass in 
California. US domination of the rare earths market 
lasted until the late 1980s, when, following significant 
increases in production in the late 1970s, China 
flooded the market and caused a price depression that 
both inhibited new mining projects outside China and 
forced the closure of existing mines. 
Having tanked its competitors, Beijing simultaneously 
set about controlling the entire production flow by 
attracting industries working with rare earths through 
advantageous conditions. 2  By the early 2000s, 
America’s most advanced rare earths magnetic facility 
had already moved, together with its patents, to China, 
and other industries also jumped on the bandwagon in 
                                                     
2  Offering them access, reduced prices, and hardly any 
environmental restrictions. 
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pursuit of cheap rare earths.3 The result? Not only is 
China dominant in the mining and refining of rare 
earths (up to 97% of worldwide production emanates 
from China), it also leads in the forming of rare earth 
metals into alloys and even the manufacture of 
magnet parts and components (up to 80% globally). 
Former President Jiang Zemin aptly summed up this 
strategy on a visit to Baotou in 1999 by stating: 
“Improve the development and applications of rare 
earths and change the resource advantage into 
economic superiority”. 
After having acquired control over all of the elements 
relevant to the rare earths industry, Beijing is now 
steadily reducing exports. This is for a number of 
reasons.  
First and foremost, China is no longer content to 
merely supply Western value chains; it now aims to 
increase its own manufacture of high-tech products 
such as consumer goods and wind turbines. With 
domestic demand rising, the Chinese government has 
begun crowding out exports via quotas and tariffs. By 
2010, for example, China had imposed export taxes 
on 23 rare earths categories4 ranging from 25% on 
selected rare earths, primarily heavy ones, to up to 
15% on light rare earths.5 This, together with other 
factors such as market sentiment, has naturally led to 
higher prices. From 2006 to August 2010, europium 
rose from $110/lb to nearly $270/lb while cerium, 
used in window polishing and autocatalysts for 
example, increased from $0.74/lb to $11.34/lb. In this 
context, particularly if prices remain high over the 
mid- to long term, Western companies could be 
enticed to move production to China as they blindly 
follow the siren song of cheaper and more accessible 
rare earths. However, given the murky intellectual 
property rights environment, which provides China 
with the added bonus of access to new technologies 
and innovations, and given uncertainties with regards 
to demand, supply, prices and China in general, the 
majority of market players have so far been 
disinclined to re-locate production to China.6 
Second, Beijing aims to increase its control and 
consolidate its domestic rare earths industry to 
                                                     
3 “Critical and Strategic Failure of Rare Earth Resources”, J. 
Kennedy,  March 2010, 
(http://www.smenet.org/rareEarthsProject/TMS-NMAB-
paperV-3.pdf) 
4 These include many rare earth oxides, unmixed and mixed 
rare earth chlorinates, ores of rare earth metals, rare earth 
materials intermixed or interalloyed, etc.  
5 Industry often divides rare earth elements into heavy rare 
earths (europium to lutetium) and light rare earths (lanthanum 
to samarium). 
6  This is based on discussions with companies at the Raw 
Materials Congress of the Association of German Industries 
(BDI) on 26 October 2010 in Berlin, Germany. 
transform it into something akin to a ‘rare earths 
OPEC of one’. According to a draft plan by the 
Chinese central government, a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions will take place that will see around 120 
mining companies merge into fewer than ten and 73 
processing firms into about 20, supposedly by 2015. 
In addition, Beijing plans to establish a stockpiling 
system and rare earths producing provinces such as 
Shandong and Inner Mongolia have been asked to 
unify the supervision of extraction and set up a 
monitoring system for the entire production, 
transportation and sale of rare earths.7 Coupled with 
this, Baotou Steel Rare Earth, which alone supplies 
46% of the global market, and Jiangxi Copper have 
expressed interest in creating a unified pricing 
mechanism for light rare earths. According to equity 
analysts, that news alone was a prime reason behind a 
significant rise in prices. In short, the industry is being 
consolidated and production significantly controlled, 
as the government is considering eliminating 
producers whose annual production capacity is less 
than 8,000 tons of mixed rare earth minerals. This has 
also led to a crackdown on illegal mining and exports, 
which have provided importers with an important 
source of rare earths. 
Last but not least, China aims to reduce the extremely 
high environmental burden associated with rare earths 
production. Mining and refining is difficult due to 
radioactive slurry tailings coming from thorium and 
uranium commonly found in rare earth ores as well as 
the toxic acids used in refining processes. Regulations 
are therefore currently being drafted that aim to 
upgrade production techniques. According to Yang 
Wanxi, a government adviser, the permissible amount 
of ammonia nitrogen per litre of production waste 
water will be lowered to 15 (from 25) milligrams. 
These new standards might close down numerous 
miners, further affecting supplies.8 Beijing has often 
used these environmental concerns to argue for the 
restriction of rare earth supply. While it is an 
important and justifiable factor that explains reduced 
output, China is at times stretching this argument to 
mean that there will be significantly reduced exports 
to the West. This need not be the case. Naturally, 
reduced output could lead to less material being 
available for export but in an ideal, free, competitive 
market it can also mean less material available for the 
domestic market if international competitors offer 
better prices so more production is allocated to 
exports in order to maximise profits. The fact of the 
                                                     
7  “China Provinces to Unify Rare Earth Controls, Global 
Times, says”, Bloomberg News, 8 September 2010 
(http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-08/china-
provinces-to-unify-rare-earth-controls-global-times-says.html). 
8 “Tighter standards mulled for rare earths”, China Daily, 8 
November 2010. 
Unearthing China’s Rare Earths Strategy | 3 
matter is that exports are first and foremost curbed by 
Chinese tariffs and quotas and that environmental 
regulation affecting production will have an auxiliary 
rather than primary effect. 
Increasing political tensions 
The world supply of rare earth metals is therefore 
volatile. This is particularly so in the context of 
changing needs. While the current demand of around 
134,000 tons per year is met by an annual production 
of 124,000 tons, supplemented by above-ground 
stocks such as from inventories, a paper by the US 
Congressional Research Service states that : 
world demand is projected to rise to 180,000 
tons annually by 2012, while… by 2014, 
global demand for rare earth elements may 
exceed 200,000 tons per year. China’s output 
may reach 160,000 tons per year.9 
Such a rise in demand would lead to a shortage of 
40,000 tons by 2014. These figures do not include the 
breaking-out of new technologies or innovations that 
require REEs, nor do they include any possible further 
reductions from China or a significant economic 
upswing.10 The latter is a real concern, particularly 
given that around one year ago the Chinese Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 
recommended that the export of the most valuable 
rare earths be completely halted. 
China’s rare earths strategy, however, is not simply a 
hard-nosed business plan that pays economic 
dividends; its strategic foresight is now also 
translating into significant political clout. After an 
initial period of calm following Japan’s detention of 
the captain of a Chinese fishing boat, for example, 
Beijing put aside its guiding principle tao guang yang 
hui (“bide our time and build up our capabilities”) and 
came out swinging, blocking exports of rare earths to 
Japanese importers. 
While Chinese officials have denied claims of an 
official export ban, it remains the case that exports 
were indeed halted, either by (un)official word from 
Beijing or due to independent actions from provincial 
party bosses or local officials. In the unlikely event 
that central government did not give the command, 
this would suggest that there is more chaos in the 
Middle Kingdom than meets the eye, something that 
would be of significant concern to Beijing. At one 
point in this saga, even the supply to the US and 
Europe was supposedly curtailed, with US Secretary 
                                                     
9 Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply 
Chain, Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2010.  
10 On the other hand, it is clear that a significant economic 
downswing could likewise slightly reduce demand for rare 
earths. 
of State Hillary Clinton swiftly raising the issue with 
her Chinese counterparts. These events significantly 
raised tensions and greatly harmed China’s image as a 
reliable economic player in the world. 
Western options 
The lack of long-term strategic thinking has led the 
West and its industries to sleepwalk into a great 
dependency on Chinese production, lulled by the 
belief that the days of cheap rare earths would never 
end. These rare earths cut-offs should now jolt it back 
into action. After all, the term ‘rare earths’ is 
something of a misnomer; most rare earth elements 
are far more abundant than the term suggests. 
Deposits exist in the US, Canada, Australia, 
Greenland and even Sweden, where rare earths were 
first discovered, and actions are currently underway to 
access these resources. Molycorp Minerals alone, with 
its re-opened mine at Mountain Pass, California, 
expects to produce almost 20,000 tonnes of rare earth 
oxides (REO) by the end of 2012, while projects in 
Australia (Mt. Weld, Nolans, Dubbo Zirconia) and 
Canada (Hoidas Lake and the promising Thor Lake) 
are expected to be in production before 2014. Barring 
Chinese moves to again flush the market with cheap 
rare earths, which would clearly be contrary to their 
current strategy, non-Chinese mining can expect to 
experience a real boost in the coming years, which 
should reduce Chinese dominance in the mid- to long 
term.  
The West should ensure that this development goes 
hand-in-hand with new refining, alloying and 
production capabilities, all of which used to be 
present to some degree. In 1990, for example, the US 
had 12 rare earth oxide magnet production factories 
providing 6,000 jobs, all for a global market that 
created $600 million in gross revenue. Twenty years 
later, only four of those facilities remain with one-
tenth of the previous workforce, while the market has 
expanded to well over $7 billion.11 Creating a secure 
production chain for the low-carbon high-tech sector 
could therefore not only take advantage of the large 
international market but would also provide new jobs.  
This, however, will take time; up to ten years 
according to some industry experts. In the intervening 
period, the West has an array of domestic and foreign 
policy tools at its disposal.  
With regards to China on the foreign policy and trade 
front, a possible (although antagonistic) move could 
be to launch a second raw materials case to the WTO, 
following a first batch by the US, Mexico and the 
                                                     
11 J. Kennedy, Critical and Strategic Failure of Rare Earth 
Resources, paper presented by the President of Wings 
Enterprises Inc. 2010. 
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European Union against China with regards to export 
restrictions and taxes on bauxite, fluorspar, coke, 
magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, 
yellow phosphorus and zinc. According to the law 
firm Stewart & Stewart, a strong second case could be 
made for a violation by China on the basis of export 
taxes alone.12 A step in this direction is already being 
taken, with the US United Steelworkers (USW) 
having filed a petition under US trade law Section 301 
calling for the government to take action against 
China’s “unfair trade practices to dominate green 
technology goods” by limiting access to critical raw 
materials. The US Senate and House of Congress 
were quick to pick this up, and the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative recently 
announced that the Obama administration has 
accepted the petition and will act on it accordingly.  
Rushing into this, however, is unwise and could 
escalate the situation. Pascal Lamy, Director-General 
of the WTO, has already expressed a negative view of 
such an approach. This is particularly the case 
because the general WTO rules do not specifically 
prohibit export taxes.13 In this context, there has been 
some talk of using the Doha Development Agenda to 
launch a new multilateral WTO agreement on export 
taxes. Given the lack of progress in Doha, this is 
extremely unlikely. Export quotas, however, could be 
challenged under GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) Article XI, 14  although it also 
focuses more on import than export restrictions. 
The United States and the European Union would 
therefore be well-advised to first wait and see what 
the result of their first case against China is going to 
be, with the next hearing on this case expected in 
December/January and a decision soon afterwards. 
Should this case fail, a second case will only 
aggravate the situation further, quite apart from the 
fact that it would also be doomed to failure. In a 
nutshell, it would do more harm than good.  
Instead, the West should go for more co-operative 
approaches, which so far have gained little traction. 
                                                     
12 Hearing on “Rare Earth Minerals and 21st Century Industry”, 
US House of Representatives Committee on Science and 
Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 
Testimony of Terence P. Stewart, 16 March 2010. 
13  Supposedly around one-third of WTO members impose 
export duties. 
14  Article XI – General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions. “1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than 
duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licences or other measures shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting 
party.” 
For example, it could make China an offer it would 
find difficult to refuse. While, in the short term at 
least, the West needs access to rare earths, China 
needs Western technology. This has been clearly 
shown by Chinese demands to ease Japanese high 
technology export controls in response to Japanese 
calls to ease rare earths restrictions. Making a quid 
pro quo on this issue could relieve short-term risks 
and allow the necessary breathing space until new 
mining and refining capacities are sufficiently 
developed. In addition, China could be provided with 
environmentally-friendly mining technologies, which 
would help the country to reduce the environmental 
burden associated with the production of rare earths. 
There could also be important best-practice sharing in 
this context. The European Commission, for example, 
has recently provided new guidelines on reconciling 
non-energy extraction within protected areas under 
NATURA 2000. 15  It could share these with its 
Chinese counterparts, which could help them in 
designing policies and regulations for their mining 
industries and environmental heritage. 
Furthermore, in the field of research and development 
China, together with Japan, the US and the EU could 
also bundle forces to some degree on mutually 
beneficial technologies, for example in the field of 
more sustainable mining, recycling or resource 
efficiency. China has a proud tradition in rare earth 
research. It has many important laboratories and 
centres, such as those mentioned previously in 
addition to the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth 
Materials, Chemistry and Applications (affiliated with 
Beijing University) and the State Key Laboratory of 
Rare Earth Resource Utilization in Changchun, as 
well as research programmes, such as Programme 863 
(National High-Tech Research and Development) and 
Programme 973 (National Basic Research). 16 
Coupling those with US research programmes and the 
upcoming 8th EU Research Framework Programme 
(FP8) could create some valuable synergies. 
Better and more reliable data are also acquired for 
rare earths elements. The supply situation regarding 
rare earths remains patchy at best, with some claiming 
the resource crunch is nigh and others stating that new 
mines will stave off such a scenario. More concrete 
information is needed for each individual rare earth as 
the price and supply situation is very different for 
each one. 
A report by the European Commission on critical raw 
materials, for example, was unable to distinguish 
between the different rare earths, which demonstrates 
                                                     
15 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/ 
management/guidance_en.htm 
16 C. Hurst, “China’s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements”, 
Joint Force Quarterly, issue 59, October 2010. 
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the difficulty but also the need of doing so. 17 
Regrettably, this report also judged the criticality of 
rare earths for a ten-year horizon only by the supply 
concentration, economic demand and last but not least, 
the political stability of the producing countries. Had 
the report taken into account all new projects coming 
on-line and the reserves in general, the outlook on rare 
earths supply could have been different. Be that as it 
may, what it demonstrates is a real lacuna in this field, 
which needs to be addressed. International co-
operation, particularly between the US, the EU and 
Japan will be crucial here. These three actors, forming 
a strategic triangle, could build up a common database 
with reliable supply and demand figures as well as 
their projections. This could help in the development 
of an early-warning system and policy options to 
address supply risks (as is the case for oil). 
Domestically, a rare earths production chain would 
obviously benefit from state loan guarantees, which 
would quicken the development. This is already 
envisioned in a legislative bill in the US, which could 
see the formation of a Rare Earth Cooperative with 
Department of Defence backing possibly at the Pea 
Ridge mine in Missouri.18 
In the medium- to long term, however, increased 
efforts in raising resource efficiency, recycling and 
the substitution of rare earths will be most important. 
With regards to substitution and recycling, Japan has 
already taken a clear lead. Hitachi has claimed to have 
produced an electric engine that runs on cheaper and 
more abundant ferric oxides. While this is not 
currently large enough to power a vehicle, it has been 
successful in reaching almost the same performance 
level as a rare earths engine. In terms of recycling, 
Japan has also made large investments in research and 
development in this field. According to government-
affiliated experts, the electronic products currently in 
Japanese waste streams could contain up to 300,000 
tons of rare earths. This is the equivalent of about ten 
years of Japanese imports.  
The European Union should also play a leading role 
in resource and energy efficiency, recycling and 
substitution efforts. These aspects are after all crucial 
for the future competitiveness of European industry. 
Given the fact that Europe’s industry cannot compete 
with wages against developing and emerging 
economies it must use its technological and 
innovation capacity in the field of raw materials to 
boost its competitiveness. This is particularly 
                                                     
17  Defining Critical Raw Materials, Report by the ad hoc 
group of the Raw Materials Supply Group, European 
Commission, June 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/raw-materials/files/docs/report-b_en.pdf). 
18 “Bond backs funding for rare earth elements production”, 
St Louis Today, 29 October 2010 (http://www.stltoday.com/ 
business/article_8c1d99f7-7c14-5fb4-99e4-ef9214f59562.html) 
important because resources, materials and energy are 
responsible for over 50% of production costs. 
Increasing the efficient use of these resources would 
therefore lower costs. The same holds true for the 
recycling of many resources, as secondary material is 
cheaper and has a more positive CO2 balance than 
virgin material. 
Unfortunately, the Commission is currently only 
paying minimal attention to these aspects in its 
forthcoming Raw Materials strategy (publication 
envisaged for 1 December 2010). In a current draft, 
the Commission has as its first priority the trade 
dimension, which overwhelmingly focuses on the 
WTO and retaliatory measures against export 
restrictions, immediately followed by a great focus on 
mining inside the European Union, particularly 
addressing the NATURA 2000 protected site. Only 
near the end of the report are industrial measures such 
as resource efficiency and recycling mentioned, in 
spite of the fact that these measures are crucial for 
Europe’s industrial competitiveness. 
Again, looking at the example of Japan, their focus is 
exactly the inverse of that of the EU. At a recent 
meeting with representatives from Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) their approach 
was outlined as first recycling, second efficiency and 
substitution, and then finally securing international 
supplies. If the European Union fails to invest in the 
first two fields adequately it will fail to open up new 
business opportunities and enhance its 
competitiveness. A strategy that does not 
acknowledge this is not worthy of the name. 
Ultimately, it is clear that China s caught the West 
completely off-guard as it built up strategic strength in 
this sector over the years. The recent rare earths cut-
offs and continuing restrictions have put the spotlight 
on this issue and are an impetus to action. We should 
not let it go to waste. 
